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Abstract 
This paper utilises a large nationally representative household survey of unusual scope and richness from 
Indonesia to analyse how the receipt of educational transfers, scholarships and related assistance 
programmes affects the labour supply of children and the marginal spending behaviour of households on 
children’s educational goods. We found strong evidence of educational cash transfers and related assistance 
programmes significantly decreasing the time spent by children in income-generating activities in 
Indonesia. Households receiving educational transfers, scholarships and assistance were also found to 
spend more at the margin on voluntary educational goods. These results were stronger for children living 
in poor families. Our results are particularly relevant for understanding the role of cash transfers and 
educational assistance in middle income countries where enrolment rates are already at satisfactory levels, 
but the challenge is to keep the students in school at post-primary levels. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of government transfers and subsidies to address the challenges posed by poverty, child labour 
and low levels of educational attainment among the more vulnerable sections of the population, 
namely, women and children, has generated substantial interest in both research and public policy 
forums. Educational transfers and subsidies in particular can deliver the initial stimulus to move an 
economy to a relatively more desirable equilibrium in the presence of poverty traps, externalities and 
multiple equilibria (Banerjee 2003;  Galor and Zeira 1993). Additionally, along with school voucher 
programmes and certain subsidised education schemes, educational cash transfer programmes have 
now become part of a growing policy emphasis on the use of market-oriented demand-side 
interventions to combat poverty and child labour. They complement traditional supply-side 
instruments, such as general subsidies or investments in schools, hospitals, and other providers of 
social services. Ultimately, positive externalities and higher equity in educational expenditures 
generated through these transfers and subsidies will lead to higher levels of welfare and will yield 
concave returns for the social planner (Das 2004).  
Both conditional and unconditional Cash Transfers (CCTs and UCTs) have been rigorously evaluated 
worldwide, covering a wide range of programmes including non-contributory pension schemes, 
education transfers, disability benefits, child allowance, and income support. Conditional transfer 
programmes such as Progresa (now referred to as Oportunidades) in Mexico, Bolsa Escola (now called 
Bolsa Familia) in Brazil, and Red de Proteccion Social in Nicaragua have proved evidence in fostering 
investment in human capital, increasing the use of health resources, and being successful in combating 
poverty and vulnerability (Behrman et.al 2005; Bourguignon et.al 2003). Unconditional programme 
evaluations such as the cash transfer programme in Ecuador (Bono de Desarollo Humano), the old 
age pension programme in South Africa, or the child support grants also in South Africa, have 
concluded that all of these programmes in general help to reduce child labour, increase school 
enrolment and reduce drop-out rates, and improve health and nutrition outcomes in children 
(Edmonds and Schady 2009; Edmonds 2006; Case, Hosegood, and Lund 2005; Duflo 2003). 
A plethora of evidence now exists on whether there is a trade-off between common forms of work 
and schooling, especially within the context of social assistance and schooling incentives. Child labour 
has a tendency to decline with household prosperity and the availability of schools and small 
incentives, such as providing children with a meal in school or giving parents subsidies, transfers and 
scholarships. The vast amount of literature that exists evaluating impacts indicates that many transfer 
programmes have successfully increased school attendance and reduced child labour supply (ECLAC, 
2006; Fizbein and  Schady, 2009; Behrman et al. 2005; Schady & Araujo 2008). However, recent 
impact evaluation studies have also shown that in some instances interventions to encourage schooling 
and reduce child labour have had unintended consequences (Cigno and Rosati, 2005; Edmonds, 2007). 
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In fact, some policies and programmes that have been implemented to increase schooling have actually 
increased the probability of children engaging in work. Thus, it is important to note that the empirical 
evidence on the causal effects of schooling, child labour and education assistance programmes can 
sometimes be ambiguous, and may have many different policy implications. 
One of the objectives of this study is to test for intra-household flypaper effects (IFE) by examining 
the impact of an education cash transfer on child-level education expenditures in Indonesia. Education 
transfers are designed to improve child schooling and raise educational spending. The ability of such 
programmes to have a positive impact on individual children depends on how households choose to 
allocate the transfer among their members; interventions that target specific individuals in a household 
may become futile by reallocations of the resource away from the child. On the other hand, when 
transfers are not reallocated away from the intended beneficiary, this phenomenon is referred to as 
the intra-household ‘flypaper effect’ because the transfer ‘sticks’ to the child (like flies stick on 
flypaper). 
Notwithstanding the large recent literature on the impacts of various social protection and transfer 
programmes on household welfare outcomes such as school enrolment and child labour, relatively 
little attention has been paid to studying the effect of such transfers on household expenditure patterns 
and their flypaper effects. Even the existing studies on intra-household flypaper effects are mostly on 
nutrition related outcomes, with the exception of Shi (2008). For  example, Jacoby (2002) examines 
the impact of a school feeding programme on child caloric intake in the Philippines. He finds no 
reallocation of calories away from the child within the household in response to the feeding 
programme. The total daily calorie intake of the child rises almost one for one with the school meal 
calories. Afridi (2005) analyses the impact of a school feeding programme on daily caloric 
consumption of children in India and investigates factors which affect the magnitude of the 
reallocation of resources. The study finds that nutrient intake of programme participants increased by 
49 to 100 percent. Shi (2008) studies the existence of reallocation of resources inside the household 
after a child receives a subsidy intended to cover the school fees in rural China. The study concludes 
that educational fee reductions were matched by increased voluntary educational spending on the 
same children receiving fee reductions, providing strong evidence of an intra-household flypaper 
effect. 
Therefore as government transfers and subsidies are becoming increasingly popular in developing 
countries, one critical policy question that arises and needs to be investigated is to what extent the 
intended beneficiaries of such public transfer programmes actually benefit from these policy initiatives. 
It is vital to investigate whether government transfers to a specific household member, such as to a 
poor student, “stick” to that specific student, child, etc. Or, as the theory of altruism within the 
household (Becker, 1974, 1981) implies, where households pool their income and redistribute it 
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among the members, intra-household resource reallocation in response to an individual welfare 
scheme may nullify any expected gains to the recipient of the transfer.  
In this paper we first analyse the decisions to attend school and to work. Because school and work 
decisions are closely related, they are treated as simultaneous decisions which will be analysed in the 
context of a bivariate Probit model. We begin by attempting to ascertain the effect of child labour on 
schooling and to determine how various individual and household characteristics affect the chances 
that a child will go to school and/or participate in other activities which may interfere with schooling. 
Next, we investigate how the receipt of educational transfers, scholarships and related assistance affect 
the labour supply of children in Indonesia. 
Finally, we test, for the first time, whether an intra-household flypaper effect exists for child-targeted 
transfers by investigating the impact of Indonesia’s education cash transfer programme for poor 
students on both household and child-level voluntary education expenditures. For most households 
in Indonesia, with the education cash transfer for poor students, parents had more money for all 
expenditures, including expenditures on voluntary educational goods and other non-educational 
goods. If the IFE exists, we would expect parents to spend the extra money especially on the voluntary 
education expenditure of the child receiving the transfer. We will utilize a rich dataset that contains 
child-specific education expenditures, enabling us to examine if the education cash transfer increased 
voluntary education expenditure and whether the flypaper effect existed within the household. 
 
2. Schooling, Child Labour and Education Programmes: Review of the Evidence 
from Indonesia 
Almost all educational indicators have improved remarkably over the past 40 years in Indonesia 
(Suharti 2013). Both net enrolment rates for primary and junior secondary schools experienced 
significant increases during this period of time. The net primary school enrolment rate increased from 
72 percent in 1975, reaching nearly universal coverage by 2009. The net enrolment rate for junior 
secondary education also rose from 18 percent in the 1970s to about 70 percent in recent years. 
Achievements in early childhood education (ECD) are also notable. Currently, 50 percent of 4 to 6 
year olds have attained some type of early learning or education (up from 25 percent a decade earlier). 
The improvements in school enrolment rates have brought Indonesia nearer to its neighbours, 
resulting in a higher than expected senior secondary enrolment rate for its level of GDP per capita. 
As an example, Indonesia’s enrolment rates profile has paralleled that of China, with higher than 
expected secondary education enrolment rates for its level of income, but it is still behind in higher 
education. Indonesia is also one of the few countries in the world that was able to increase public 
expenditure on education by over 60 percent during the last five-year period. A constitutionally 
mandated allocation of (a minimum of) 20 percent of government spending towards education 
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(hereafter "the 20 percent rule") was introduced by the government of Indonesia in 2003. This 
requirement led to an enormous increase in resources for education, making education the largest type 
of government expenditure after fuel subsidies (World Bank 2013). 
However, against the backdrop of education as a whole showing inspiring outcomes, the distribution 
of the benefits of education policy in some respects still do not appear satisfactory. For example, a 
study conducted by Arza Del Granado, et al. (2007) found the existence of a wide gap between poor 
and rich groups at the junior and senior secondary school levels. Children from poor families are 20 
percent less likely to be enrolled in junior secondary education than children from wealthier families. 
Suryadarma (2006) found that children living in rural areas have less access to junior secondary 
education. Jones (2003) conducted qualitative interviews in several provinces in Indonesia and found 
several reasons behind the disparities in schooling opportunity across Indonesia. Firstly, children from 
poor families were found to have difficulties in paying for transportation costs associated with 
schooling. Secondly, in some parts of the country relatively low recognition among parents regarding 
the importance of education were also a reason for children not attending school. Finally, cultural 
factors also play an important role in some instances; for example, the Madurese tribe in Pontianak 
traditionally arrange their daughters to be married as soon as they finish primary school. Hardjono 
(2004) investigated the influence of poverty on school dropouts in two provinces in Indonesia: Bali 
and West Nusa Tenggara. The study found that one of the primary reasons for the very high primary 
school completion rates among Balinese children is the culture of prioritising education among the 
Balinese. This was in contrast to a relatively higher percentage of children not finishing primary school 
in West Nusa Tenggara, as a result of the low regard for education among parents. Most importantly, 
Hardjono’s study found that non-continuation into junior secondary school in both provinces was 
due to the inability to pay, particularly for transportation costs, and the inadequate capacity and 
facilities in the junior secondary schools. 
Since the 1998 economic crisis, the government of Indonesia in partnership with several development 
organisations has been implementing educational assistance and transfer programmes at several points 
in time, in order to address the financial difficulties and various other constraints faced by parents and 
children with respect to schooling. In recent years, there has been a small but growing literature 
evaluating education assistance programmes in Indonesia, especially investigating the effects on school 
enrolment and drop-out rates. Cameron (2009) evaluates the role played by Indonesia’s social safety 
net scholarships programme in reducing school dropout rates during the Asian financial crisis, with 
the assumption that at that time many households would have found it difficult to keep their children 
in school and thus drop-out rates would be high. The study found scholarships to be effective in 
reducing drop-outs at the level of schooling at which students were historically most at risk of 
dropping out, which is lower secondary school. Sparrow (2007) investigated the impact of an 
Indonesian scholarship programme implemented in 1998 to preserve access to education for the poor 
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during the economic crisis. The study found the programme to have increased school enrolment, 
especially for primary school-aged children from poor rural households. Sparrow’s paper also 
concludes that the scholarships  assisted households in smoothing consumption during the crisis 
period. 
In this study, we seek to examine the effects of the Cash Transfer for the Poor Students 
programme/Bantuan Siswa Miskin (BSM) which was introduced in 2008 and covers all education 
levels from elementary school to university. The key objectives of the programme are to remove 
barriers preventing marginalised students from participating in education, to assist poor students in 
gaining appropriate access to education services, to prevent school drop-outs, to help in meeting the 
educational needs of at-risk children, as well as to support the Government’s Nine Years Compulsory 
Education programme. The BSM programme provides cash transfers to cover associated educational 
costs (such as books, school transportation and uniforms) for students from poor households who 
are selected by school administrators. It is fully financed by the central government and does not 
require any contributions or cost-sharing on the part of students as beneficiaries, nor from local 
governments or the schools themselves.  
During the initial 2008-2009 period, targeting for the BSM programme lacked clarity in the selection 
of beneficiaries. The number of beneficiaries was determined by the availability of funds received by 
provincial authorities from the Ministry of Education, and the selection of beneficiaries was often left 
to local education offices or headmasters of the schools. At the national level, there was an 
understanding that the scholarship needed to prioritise children whose families were in the conditional 
cash transfer programme (PKH programme, described below) as these families were very poor. 
Disbursement of the transfer was done at the beginning of the academic year (usually in the months 
of July or August). 
In 2009, the BSM programme budget of IDR 1.6 trillion covered 3.6 million students. At present, the 
programme covers 8 million students across the country, ranging from primary school to tertiary 
education level. In 2009, the unit cost per scholarship ranged between IDR360,000 to IDR720,000 
depending on the level and type of school the student was attending. Poor students enrolled in 
madrasah (Islamic) schools received a higher amount than those in regular schools. To put these 
numbers into perspective, average household per student spending on primary education was IDR 
362,000 per year in 2009. In contrast, average household per student spending on junior secondary 
education was IDR 653,000 in 2009, while household spending on senior secondary education was 
IDR 1,438,000. Thus, for the poorest households the scholarships are quite significant contributions 
to monthly income and cover a large part of the expenditures on education. 
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3. Analytical and Conceptual Framework  
We first develop the theoretical model behind our schooling and labour supply decision of children 
and assume the “unitary model” of the household where the head of the household is the decision 
maker. Our model follows Ravallion et al. (2000) and Rosati et al. (2003) where the utility function of 
the representative household in our model is given by: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻, 𝑆: 𝑋) 
Where household consumption is 𝐶, 𝐻 is the child’s leisure, 𝑆 is the child’s school attendance and 𝑋 
is the vector of exogenous child, household and demographic characteristics which parameterise the 
utility function.  
The time constraint that maximises utility can be expressed as: 
𝑇 = 𝐻 + 𝑆 + 𝐿 
Where the household head allocated the child’s total time-𝑇, between leisure –𝐻, school attendance-
𝑆, and child’s labour supply-𝐿. 
By equating adult exogenous household income-𝑌 and output from household production with cost 
of production and household consumption, the household budget constraint can be stated as: 
𝑃𝑐𝐶 + 𝑃𝑠𝑆 ≤ 𝑌 + 𝑊𝐿 
Where 𝑃𝑐 , 𝑃𝑠 and 𝑊 are price of consumption, schooling and child labour.  
The household utility maximisation problem can be formally stated as: 
max
𝐶,𝐻,𝑆
𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻, 𝑆: 𝑋) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   
𝑃𝑐𝐶 + 𝑃𝑠𝑆 ≤ 𝑌 + 𝑊𝐿
𝑇 = 𝐻 + 𝑆 + 𝐿
 
The educational cash transfer (M) can be introduced by simply re-writing a new budget constraint that 
maximizes 𝑈 as: 
𝑃𝑐𝐶 + 𝑃𝑠𝑆 ≤ 𝑌 + 𝑊𝐿 + 𝑀 
We assume household income-𝑌, adult labour supply and leisure to be exogenous. Thus when parents 
become unemployed, it is not because of their choice but due to external market conditions.  
Solving the first-order conditions of the model yields several outcomes. Comparative statics properties 
of the model show that an increase in parent’s income/returns to labour will lead to an increase in the 
probability that a child attends school and reduces the numbers of hours worked. Similarly, when 
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there are high returns to child labour (increased work opportunities, higher wages), schooling and 
leisure will fall and the supply of labour will rise. Employing this framework shows how child labour 
can be a function not only of income and wealth but also of parents’ occupation, characteristics and 
preferences. It is also evident that household consumption-C (which includes consumption of 
voluntary educational goods) will increase with income, and that a cash transfer will not alter relative 
prices and will only induce an income effect.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy  
We begin with the econometric specification for the child’s decision to attend school or to work. The 
decision for a child to attend school, supply labour or both is a time allocation decision. Thus the 
decision whether a child works or attends school is a joint one as both activities would be competing 
for the child’s time. We use a bivariate Probit model that explicitly takes this interdependency into 
account and test the likelihood of children working and going to school, conditional on varying 
individual and household characteristics. A bivariate Probit model allows for the existence of possible 
correlated disturbance between two Probit equations. It also allows us to test whether the joint 
estimation has additional explanatory power compared to using an univariate Probit estimation for 
each decision (Ersado 2002). 
The general structure of the bivariate Probit specification can be expressed as: 
𝑦1
∗ = 𝑿𝟏
′ 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜀1 
𝑦2
∗ = 𝑿𝟐
′ 𝜷𝟐 + 𝜀2 
Where the observability criteria for the two binary outcomes can be stated as: 
𝑦1 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑦2 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where 𝑿𝟏 and 𝑿𝟐 are vectors of individual and household covariates that affect the child’s schooling 
and labour supply decision, respectively. 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 are error terms to have a bivariate normal 
distribution with 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝜀1, 𝜀2|𝑿𝟏, 𝑿𝟐 ]=𝜌. 
The joint probabilities that enter into the likelihood function can be expressed as: 
ℙ𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦1 = 𝑖, 𝑦2 = 𝑗 |𝑿𝟏, 𝑿𝟐 ) = Φ(𝕡𝑿𝟏
′ 𝜷𝟏, 𝕢𝑿𝟐
′ 𝜷𝟐;  𝕡, 𝕢, 𝜌) 
Where  𝕡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1 = 1
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1 = 0
      and    𝕢 == {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2 = 1
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2 = 0
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The log-likelihood for the bivariate Probit is then given by: 
ℓ(𝜃) = ∑ ln Φ10(𝜃) +
𝑦1=1,𝑦2=0
∑ ln Φ11(𝜃) + ∑ ln Φ01(𝜃) + ∑ ln Φ00(𝜃)
𝑦1=0,𝑦2=0𝑦1=0,𝑦2=1𝑦1=1,𝑦2=1
 
 
Where Φ𝑖𝑗(⋅) is the joint probability that 𝑦1 assumes a value of 𝑖 and 𝑦2 takes a value of 𝑗, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 I,j=0,1 
and 𝜃 is the parameter vector consisting of 𝜷𝟏, 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜌. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained 
by simultaneously setting to zero the derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to the 
parameters of interest. The estimated regression coefficients will be converted into marginal effects 
with the same vector of covariates being included in the two equations for the system to be identified. 
 
Next, we employ the quasi-experimental propensity score methodology to estimate the impact of 
education transfers and related assistance on child’s labour supply and educational expenditure. We 
will utilise a rich dataset which contains individual-specific education expenditures, enabling us to 
examine if the education cash transfer increased voluntary education expenditure and whether the 
flypaper effect existed within the household. In this study, we accept the existence of the intra-
household flypaper effect only if there is a statistically significant increase or positive impact on the 
voluntary education expenditure of a child receiving an education cash transfer.  
The basic problem in treatment evaluation begins with the inference of a causal relationship between 
the treatment and outcome. In a canonical single treatment setting, one can observe (𝑌𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖),
𝑖 … , 𝑁 and the impact on 𝑌 from a hypothetical change in 𝐷, while holding 𝑋 constant. Such inference 
is the key feature of a potential outcome model, where the outcome variable of the treated state is 
compared to the outcome variable of the untreated state. However, it is impossible to observe both 
states for any given individual simultaneously. Thus, the problem is akin to one of missing data, which 
can be solved by techniques of casual inference carried out in terms of counterfactuals. The 
counterfactual question is: ‘what would have happened to children who received the education transfer 
if they had not received the transfer’.  
Firstly, we assume the setup of a randomised treatment assignment, where no one is included in the 
treatment group because the benefits of the treatment to that individual would be large, and no one is 
excluded because the expected benefit is small. The thinking behind random assignment is that by 
randomising treatment assignment, the group attributes for the different treatments will be roughly 
equivalent and therefore any effect observed between treatment groups can be linked to the treatment 
effect and is not a characteristic of the individuals in the group.  Following Caliendo et.al. (2005), let 
the vector of observables be (𝑌𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖), 𝑖 … , 𝑁, where 𝑌 is the scalar-value outcome variable, 𝑋 is 
a vector of observables, and 𝐷 a binary indicator of treatment (𝐷 takes the value of 1 if the child 
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receives the transfer, 0 otherwise). In the potential outcome framework, one can define ∆ as the 
difference between the outcome in the treated and untreated states where: 
∆= 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 
It is important to note that ∆ is not directly observable since an individual cannot be observed in both 
states. The two key evaluation parameters that will be used in this study will be the average treatment 
effect on the treated state (ATT), defined as (in sample analogues): 
ATT =
1
N
∑[∆i|Di = 1]
NT
i=1
 
Where NT = ∑ Di
N
i=1 . 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is the mean effect of those who actually participate in the programme. 
The treatment evaluation problem can be easily understood by writing the ATT as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(∆|𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1) 
From the immediately above equation, the problem of selection bias is straightforward, since the 
second term on the right side- 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1) the counterfactual mean of the treated - is not observable. 
If the condition 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 0) holds, one can use the nonparticipants as the 
comparison group. But with non-experimental data this condition will not hold, since the components 
which determine the receiving of the transfer also determines the outcome variable of interest 
(Caliendo et.al. (2005)). Thus, the outcomes of the transfer recipients would differ even in the absence 
of receiving the transfer, leading to a selection bias. It may be the case that selection bias can be fully 
accounted for by observables characteristics (such as age, gender, etc.). In this case, selection bias can 
be eliminated simply by including the relevant variables in the outcome equation. But in practice, 
unobservable characteristics affecting participation can also influence outcomes, expressing the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 
as: 
𝐸[𝑌1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] = 𝐴𝑇𝑇 + 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] 
The difference between the left-hand side of the equation and the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is the self-selection bias. The 
true parameter 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is only identified if: 
𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] = 0 
In this paper we adopt the quasi-experimental propensity score matching method (PSM) which deals 
explicitly with treatment selection bias and addresses the key evaluation problem of 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] 
being unobservable. 
The essential idea of propensity score matching (PSM) is to match participants and non-participants 
on their observable characteristics. The mean effect of treatment (participation) can be estimated as 
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the average difference in outcomes between the treated and non-treated. When the counterfactual 
mean for the treated- 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] is not observed, one has to invoke ‘identifying assumptions' to 
estimate the causal effect of a programme on the outcome. The first identification assumption in 
propensity score matching is referred to as the conditional independent assumption (CIA), and is 
expressed as: 
𝑌0,𝑌1  ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋 
 
It states that outcomes are independent of programme participation, after controlling for the 
variation in outcomes induced by differences in 𝑋. The second identification assumption is referred 
to as the overlap or matching assumption, written as: 
0 < 𝑃𝑟[𝐷 = 1|𝑋] < 1 
This assumption implies that for each value of 𝑋 there are both treated and untreated individuals. In 
other words, for each participant there is another non-participant with a similar 𝑋. A practical 
constraint which exists in matching is that when the number of covariates 𝑋𝑖 increases, the chances 
of finding a match reduces. However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that with matching on 
the propensity score 𝑃(𝑋), the probability of participating in a programme could achieve consistent 
estimates of the treatment effect in the same way as matching on all covariates2.  
After estimating the propensity score, the next decision to be made concerns the common support 
region(s). Enforcing the common support region ensures that any combination of characteristics 
observed in the participation group can also be observed among non-participants. The approach 
referred to as the ‘minima and maxima' condition will be used in all estimations in this paper. The 
basic criterion for minima and maxima comparison is to delete all observations whose propensity 
score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite group. Having 
                                                          
2 The proposition by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) can be stated as: Let 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) be the probability of 
unit 𝑖 having been assigned to treatment, defined as 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) ≡ Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 1| 𝑋𝑖) = 𝐸(𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖). Assume 
that 0 < 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) < 1, for all 𝑋𝑖 and Pr(𝐷1, 𝐷2 , 𝐷𝑁 | 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑁) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖)
𝐷𝑖
𝑖=1,…𝑁 (1 −
𝑃(𝑋𝑖)
1−𝐷𝑖    for the 𝑁 units in the sample. Then, {(𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖0) ⊥ 𝐷𝑖} | 𝑋𝑖  ⇒  {(𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖0)  ⊥ 𝐷𝑖} 𝑃(𝑋𝑖). 
Corollary: If  {(𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖0)  ⊥ 𝐷𝑖} | 𝑋 and the assumptions of the above proposition hold, then (∆|𝐷 =
1) = 𝐸{𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖))|𝐷𝑖 = 1}. The proposition implies that observations with the same 
propensity score have the same distribution of the full vector of covariates 𝑋𝑖. The propensity score 
will be estimated by a Probit model: Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = Φ(𝑋′𝛽). 
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enforced the common support region, the final step is to choose the matching algorithm. The general 
formula for the matching estimator is given by: 
𝐵𝑀 =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ [𝑌𝑖1 − ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌𝑗0
𝑗
]
𝑖∈{𝑑=1}
 
Where 0 < 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) ≤ 1 is the weight given to comparison unit j in the construction of the 
'counterfactual' for treated unit i. Results will be presented for four matching algorithms: nearest-
neighbour matching, caliper matching, radius matching and kernel matching. The nearest-neighbour 
matching method assigns a weight equal to one, 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1, and takes each transfer recipient in turn 
and identifies the non-recipient with the closest propensity score. The nearest-neighbour method will 
be implemented with replacement, so that a non-recipient can be used more than once as a match. A 
variant of the nearest-neighbour matching is caliper matching. The caliper matching method chooses 
the nearest-neighbour within a caliper of width 𝛿, so that {𝑗: |𝑃(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑋𝑗)| < 𝛿} where 𝑃(𝑋) is 
the propensity score. Therefore, caliper matching imposes a form of quality control on the match by 
setting a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) 
introduced a variant of caliper matching which is referred to as radius matching. In radius matching 
the idea is to use not only the nearest-neighbour within each caliper but all of the comparison members 
(non-participants) within the caliper. The final matching algorithm that will be used in the study is 
referred to as kernel matching. Kernel matching uses all the non-participants for each participant in 
the matching process. The kernel is a function that weights the contribution of each non-participant, 
so that more importance is attached to those non-participants providing a better match. The Gaussian 
and the Epanechnikov will be used as weighting functions with kernel matching. For the sake of 
comparison and to assess the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of the matching algorithm, we 
will present results for all four matching methods. 
 
5. Data 
This study employs the Indonesia Social and Economic Survey (Susenas) from July2009. Susenas is a 
nationwide survey conducted to collect information on social and economics indices. It functions as 
a main source of monitoring social and economic progress in society. Susenas has been conducted on 
an annual basis since 1963. Since 1992, in addition to a basic social and economic questionnaire (core), 
a more specialised questionnaire was introduced (module). The core questionnaire contains basic 
information about household and individual characteristics including health, death, education/literacy, 
employment, fertility and family planning, housing, and household expenditure. There are three 
modules of Susenas and each module is added in a three-year cycle. In 2009, the module's topic was 
social life, culture, and education. Unlike previous Susenas, the same sample was used for both core 
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and module questionnaires. It consisted of 291,753 households and was designed to be representative 
at national, province and district/city levels. The Susenas 2009-July survey includes an education cost 
data module containing various expenditure categories for each school-enrolled child. Descriptive 
statistics for all key variables are given in the Appendix. 
For all child-level educational expenditure analysis, we use children from the ages of 6 to 18 years. We 
only consider children who regularly participate in the labour market as child workers. It is assumed 
that these children supply labour either to earn a living for themselves or to supplement household 
incomes. Children engaged in housekeeping activities and who perform household chores – such as 
cleaning, cooking, or washing – are thus not regarded as child labour in this study. Consistent with 
previous studies on child labour and in accordance with the law, children below 15 years who 
participate in the labour market will be considered as supplying labour. Since all work-related questions 
were asked only for individuals above the age of 10 years, our sub-sample for child labour supply will 
be for all children between the ages of 10 to 14 years. The treatment variable for children to receive 
any educational assistance will be a binary variable (yes=1 and no=0) generated from the survey 
question of “Receive scholarship/educational assistance in the past year?”. Thus for both the child 
labour supply and school attendance, bivariate probit regressions and ATT treatment effects of 
educational assistance on child labour estimates will be based on the sub-sample of all children 
between the ages of 10 to 14 years. The full sample of children aged 6-18 will used for ATT treatment 
effects of educational assistance on child education spending. 
The Susenas survey collects information on a broad range of topics including demographic 
characteristics, household income and expenditure, literacy and education, household amenities and 
employment. Demographic characteristics that include both the individual and household head’s age, 
gender, marital status and the number of males and females in different age categories within the 
household were used in the analysis. The dependency ratio was calculated as the ratio of the number 
of individuals aged below 14 and above 65 to the number of working household members aged 15-
64.  Employment characteristics of the household head used in the analysis included the employment 
sector, such as agriculture, industry, services, etc. Information on housing characteristics comprised 
standard indicators such as ownership, roofing, wall and floor conditions, type and access to water, 
electricity and sanitation. Finally, we measure poverty, identifying poor households by employing the 
provincial poverty lines for rural and urban areas, which were constructed by the Indonesian Central 
Bureau of Statistics. After adjusting for spatial price differences, the official national poverty line was 
estimated at IDR. 224,602 for the July 2009 Susenas. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
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We first present the results of the decisions to attend school and to work. Because the school and 
work decisions are closely related, they are treated as simultaneous decisions which were analysed in 
the context of a bivariate Probit model. We begin by attempting to ascertain the effect of child labour 
on schooling and to determine how various individual and household characteristics affect the chances 
that a child will go to school and/or participate in other activities which may interfere with schooling. 
Next, we present the impact of the educational cash transfer on education expenditure and on the 
labour supply of children in Indonesia. 
 
Table 1 gives the estimated results from the bivariate Probit regressions. Proxies for the demand for 
market and domestic work were included in the bivariate regressions. The first column of estimates 
gives the parameters that affect the work decision, whereas the second gives the estimates of the 
parameters that affect the schooling decision. The correlation coefficient -𝜌 − is significantly negative 
in the estimations. This means that there is a negative relationship between attending school and 
working. This could be interpreted to imply the existence of some unobserved factors  that increase 
the probability of attending school decrease the probability of working. Schooling and child labour 
are thus competing activities. According to Table 1, the probability of working increases with a child’s 
age. The age variable catches the effect of the absolute returns to (?) the labour of a child of a given 
age. This could be interpreted as an indication of the fact that the accumulated human capital increases 
potential wages and therefore the probability of working. Virtually all empirical work on child labour 
has indicated that the age and gender of the child are important determinants of their educational and 
work activities. Also evident from Table 1 is how being a male child increases the probability of a child 
being involved in labour activities. 
 
We assumed that parents’ ages would also have an impact on child activities. According to Table 1, 
the household head’s age has a decreasing effect on their children’s labour supply and an increasing 
effect on schooling. Younger parents are likely to be at a more monetary-constrained point in their 
lifecycle and may have less capacity to meet school expenses, and have a greater need for their 
children’s labour. Results also suggest that higher levels of education of the household head decrease 
the probability of a child working while at the same time increasing school attendance. There is ample 
empirical evidence in the literature that the education of the parents decreases the probability of a 
child working and increases the probability of schooling. Parental education can potentially influence 
the allocation of children’s time mainly through income and preferences.  
 
Since both market work and household work is common in developing countries, we use proxies that 
capture both these types of activities. We use household heads being in agriculture to capture market 
work, since usually most children work close to home, which means it is local labour market conditions 
that will determine the demand for their labour. Similarly, we proxy the demand for domestic work 
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by using housing facilities such as poor access to water and sanitation conditions. The absence of such 
services might substantially increase the domestic workload for children with or without directly 
affecting the parents’ decision to send a child to school, once the wealth of the household has been 
controlled for. Our findings indicate that children in agricultural households have a higher probability 
of working and are less likely to attend school. Similarly, children living in houses with poor sanitation 
are also more likely to work and not attend school. 
 
The nature of the household heads’ occupation also matters: if the parents are unemployed or in 
irregular employment, a child’s labour may be considered a substitute for their labour or for hired 
labour, thus decreasing the chances of attending school. Furthermore, the effect of the father being 
in the informal sector as opposed to being a formal employee is important because it raises the 
probability that the child will also be an unpaid family worker. Consistent with this expectation, our 
results show that when the household head is in the informal sector, the probability of children 
supplying labour is also higher. 
 
We examine the effects of household composition on children’s work and schooling via the household 
dependency ratio. Findings indicate that children are more likely to engage in work and not attend 
school with higher dependency ratios within the household. The probability of children working was 
also found to be more in rural areas than in urban areas, which is a global and general characteristic 
of child labour. Table 1 also confirms Basu and Vans’ (1998) luxury axiom that poverty drives child 
labour. Usually, the joint probability of working and not going to school drops off sharply with 
household wealth. Children in poor households were found to have a higher probability of working 
and lower school attendance. This result is generally consistent with the theoretical literature which 
concludes that poverty is one of the main hypotheses explaining child labour.  
 
The Appendix presents the results for propensity to receive an educational assistantship for the 
individual samples stratified by expenditure quintiles: bottom 20th percentile, 20th-40th percentile, 40th-
60th percentile, 60th-80th percentile, top 20th percentile. Estimates are for the Probit regression where 
the binary outcome takes a value one if the child is receiving any type of an educational transfer or 
assistantship. The results are generally unsurprising and reveal a number of significant covariates of 
programme participation. It is important to note that the standard regression-based method and 
propensity score matching differ significantly with regard to the choice of control variables. In a 
standard regression, preference is usually given to variables which one can argue are exogenous to 
outcomes, but in propensity score matching the primary interest is in covariates (not good predictors), 
thus including variables even when they are poor predictors. Analytic results and simulations by Rubin 
and Thomas (1996) suggest that variables with weak predictive ability for outcomes can still help 
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minimise bias in estimating causal effects with propensity score matching. In essence, the main 
purpose of the propensity score estimation is not to predict selection for treatment but to balance 
covariates and get closer to the observationally identical non-participant. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Child Labour Supply and School Attendance – Bivariate Probit Regressions 
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Note: The general structure of the bivariate Probit specification can be expressed as: 𝑦1
∗ = 𝑿𝟏
′ 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜀1 and 𝑦2
∗ = 𝑿𝟐
′ 𝜷𝟐 + 𝜀2, where the 
observability criteria for the two binary outcomes can be stated as: 𝑦1 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 𝑦2 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. 
 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
Working Equation 
Marginal Effect 
(dy/dx)
School Equation 
Marginal Effect 
(dy/dx)
Age of Child 0.0208*** -0.0248***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Male Child 0.0209*** -0.0103***
(0.0012) (0.0013)
Household Head Age -0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Household Head Female 0.0225*** -0.0102***
(0.0026) (0.0025)
Household Head - SD Education -0.0181*** 0.0269***
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Household Head - SMP Education -0.0090*** 0.0376***
(0.0017) (0.0014)
Household Head - SMA Education -0.0107*** 0.0459***
(0.0017) (0.0013)
Household Head in Informal Sector 0.0275*** -0.0089***
(0.0014) (0.0016)
Household Head in Agriculture 0.0174*** -0.0123***
(0.0015) (0.0017)
Rural 0.0298*** -0.0058***
(0.0014) (0.0017)
House with Poor Sanitation 0.0299*** -0.0367***
(0.0016) (0.0018)
Household Dependency Ratio 0.0148*** -0.0045***
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Poor Household 0.0034** -0.0433***
(0.0015) (0.0021)
Observations 117,561 117,561
Rho -0.5606
 Wald chi-sqr(26) 8572.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Next, the common support region was examined by plotting a histogram of the propensity score. The 
common support is the region where the propensity score has a positive density for both treated and 
non-treated units. On average, observations lost due to common support were around 0.05% for each 
quintile. Figure 1 gives the frequency distribution of the propensity scores based on Probit regression 
estimates reported in the Appendix for the children receiving (treated) and not receiving (untreated) 
any educational assistantship. All other histograms reveal that there is a substantial region of overlap 
and a severe common support problem does not exist. It is evident from Figure 1 that any combination 
of characteristics observed in the treatment groups can also be observed among the control groups in 
all estimated quintiles. In all quintiles, the probability mass in the treated group is located on (?) the 
same side as that of the non-treated group. Since the main purpose is not to identify the Probit 
probability estimations but to match households, it is encouraging to see that a large fraction of 
households from both groups (treated and untreated) gets an estimated probability of the same range. 
The upshot of Figure 1 is that there is sufficient common support to provide strong evidence for 
causal inference.3 
Figure 1: Overlap and Distribution of Propensity Scores 
Quintile-1                                                             Quintile-2 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 We also performed tests on covariate balancing. It was found that the differences between the households between the 
treated and untreated groups are quite small after matching, and that matching removed any bias that existed for almost 
all covariates. A t-test of equality of means in the two samples of participants and non-participants revealed that there is 
no systematic pattern of significant differences between the covariates in the treated and non-treated groups after 
conditioning on the propensity score. The test results and the exact number of individuals lost due to common support 
requirement are available upon request from the authors. 
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Quintile-3                                                               Quintile-4 
 
Quintile-5 
 
 
Table 2 reports the estimated mean impacts on children’s voluntary educational spending. The 
estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) are obtained via propensity score 
matching, using four matching algorithms and imposing the ‘minima and maxima’ common support. 
The results for the mean impact indicate that receiving educational transfers and assistance 
significantly increases education spending for the bottom three quintiles, although the magnitude 
varies by matching method. For all quintile groups, children receiving educational assistance or 
transfers spend more at the margin on education than they would have spent without any educational 
support. For example, the nearest neighbour matching algorithm in Table 2 shows that children 
receiving educational assistance spend between 10% and 14% more at the margin on voluntary 
educational goods. In other words, when controlling for the level of expenditure, households receiving 
educational assistance and transfers spend more of their additional increments on expenditure on 
education. These large marginal increases in ‘child-specific’ education spending arising from 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Overlap in Binary Propensity Score
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Overlap in Binary Propensity Score
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Overlap in Binary Propensity Score
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educational transfers and scholarships are thus confirmatory evidence of the existence of an intra-
household flypaper effect.  
However, these gains are not visible for the children in the 80th-100th percentile, implying that even 
without receiving any additional educational support there would be no difference in voluntary 
educational spending for children in the richest quintile. Thus, selection of only the poor and 
vulnerable households becomes a pre-requisite and vital component in the design and success of any 
educational support programme. The poorest and most vulnerable children should be given special 
priority in selection and need to be regularly assessed to maintain the focus on poor and low-income 
programme participants. From the standpoint of the economy at large, these educational assistance-
inspired additional expenditures on children’s voluntary educational goods represent significant 
productive investment having critical second- and third-round effects on health, total factor 
productivity, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Binary Treatment Effects of Educational Assistance on Child Education Spending 
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Matching Algorithm ATT: Quintile - 1 ATT: Quintile - 2 ATT: Quintile - 3 ATT: Quintile - 4 ATT: Quintile - 5
NN 0.106 0.097 0.141 0.046 0.048
(0.030)*** (0.036)*** (0.040)*** (0.044) (0.053)
5-NN 0.092 0.045 0.093 0.036 0.055
(0.024)*** (0.025)** (0.031)*** (0.034) (0.041)
NN (caliper): δ=0.001 0.100 0.077 0.139 0.032 0.037
(0.030)*** (0.035)** (0.040)*** (0.044) (0.054)
Radius: δ=0.001 0.086 0.017 0.075 0.029 0.047
(0.023)*** (0.026) (0.029)*** (0.031) (0.038)
Kernel
Epanechnikov (bw=0.06) 0.086 0.055 0.084 0.036 0.032
(0.022)*** (0.026)** (0.028)*** (0.031) (0.037)
Gaussian (bw=0.1) 0.100 0.067 0.088 0.026 0.025
(0.021)*** (0.024)** (0.027)*** (0.030) (0.036)
NN 0.110 0.120 0.086 0.030 0.090
(0.043)*** (0.049)** (0.054) (0.057) (0.066)
5-NN 0.102 0.072 0.075 0.014 0.032
(0.034)*** (0.038)** (0.041)* (0.045) (0.051)
NN (caliper): δ=0.001 0.093 0.104 0.065 0.027 0.071
(0.043)** (0.048)*** (0.054) (0.058) (0.067)
Radius: δ=0.001 0.080 0.028 0.068 -0.010 0.019
(0.032)** (0.035) (0.039)* (0.042) (0.048)
Kernel
Epanechnikov (bw=0.06) 0.101 0.046 0.092 -0.012 -0.023
(0.032)*** (0.035) (0.038)** (0.041) (0.046)
Gaussian (bw=0.1) 0.101 0.061 0.076 -0.037 -0.095
(0.030)*** (0 .033)** (0.036)** (0.040) (0.076)
NN 0.058 0.077 0.001 0.092 0.132
(0.028)** (0.035)** (0.041) (0.044)** (0.054)**
5-NN 0.048 0.029 0.040 0.041 0.107
(0.022)** (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.042)**
NN (caliper): δ=0.001 0.059 0.079 -0.002 0.084 0.123
(0.028)** (.035)** (0.041) (0.044)* (0.054)**
Radius: δ=0.001 0.035 0.014 0.029 0.046 0.090
(0.021)** -0.025 (0.030) (0.032) (0.040)**
Kernel
Epanechnikov (bw=0.06) 0.039 0.023 0.054 0.052 0.103
(0.020)* (0.024) (0.029)* (0.031)* (0.040)**
Gaussian (bw=0.1) 0.052 0.044 0.084 0.068 0.100
(0 .020)** (0.024)* (0.028)*** (0.030)** (0.058)**
NN 0.062 0.0620 0.058 0.059 0.052
(0.031)** (0.034)* (0.060) (0.066) (0.158)
5-NN 0.029 0.026 0.061 0.016 0.006
(0.027) (0.033) (0.048) (0.052) (0.124)
NN (caliper): δ=0.001 0.075 0.0560 0.050 0.075 0.064
(0.032)** (0.039) (0.061) (0.063) (0.158)
Radius: δ=0.001 0.023 0.006 0.047 0.002 0.074
(0.026) (0.032) (0.047) (0.050) (0.115)
Kernel
Epanechnikov (bw=0.06) 0.019 0.000 0.067 -0.008 0.019
(0.024) (0.030) (0.045) (0.050) (0.112)
Gaussian (bw=0.1) 0.021 0.007 0.088 -0.021 0.049
(0.023) (0.029) (0.043)** (0.047) (0.110)
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Table 3: Binary Treatment Marginal Effects of Educational Assistance on Child Labour Supply 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the impact of educational transfers, scholarships and assistance on the 
probability of children working. The estimates represent the marginal effects of a child receiving 
educational assistance on the probability of being in the labour force. It is evident from the results 
that the education cash transfers and assistance given to children were generous enough to reduce the 
amount of time spent outside school working, especially for the poor. Results based on Table 3 clearly 
show that receiving educational transfers and assistance have a significant negative impact on 
children’s work for the poorest. For instance, receiving education transfers and assistance reduces the 
probability of children working in the poorest households by one to three percentage points. These 
results again confirm that benefits are heavily skewed towards the poor - the two lowest quintiles of 
the participating children receive the largest share of education assistance benefits. 
The additional monetary support from education transfers and assistance seem to reduce the pressure 
for children to work and will, in turn, allow for spending more time on school-related activities. Our 
results are indeed consistent with previous research which has shown that transfer programmes  
reduced child labour and increased schooling and homework time, changes which may all improve 
educational achievement (Maluccio, 2009; Skoufias and Parker, 2001). We also find no significant 
impact for the children on the upper part of the welfare distribution. This result with respect to both 
child labour supply and educational spending are not surprising for students at the upper part of the 
welfare distribution, as the transfers and assistance are too small of an incentive to have any positive 
promotional effects. 
 
 
 
Matching Algorithm ATT: Quintile - 1 ATT: Quintile - 2 ATT: Quintile - 3 ATT: Quintile - 4 ATT: Quintile - 5
NN -0.032 -0.0238** -0.0037 -0.0073 0.0039
(0.010)*** (0.01) (0.011) (0 .0122) (0.012)
5-NN -0.013 -0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.010
(0.007)** (0.009) (0.008) (0 .0093) (0.0095)
NN (caliper): δ=0.001 -0.021 -0.014 -0.006 -0.007 0 .0013
(0.009)** (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Radius: δ=0.001 -0.010 0.003 0 .0017 -0.001 0.011
(0.01) (0.008) (0.008) (0 .0090) (0.009)
Kernel
Epanechnikov (bw=0.06) -0.011 0.001 0 .0066 0.007 0.012
(0.007)* (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Gaussian (bw=0.1) -0.006 0.005 0 .0067 0.010 0.017
(0.007) (0.008) (0 .0075) (0 .0084) (0.009)
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6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper employed a large, nationally representative household survey from Indonesia to analyse 
how the receipt of educational transfers, scholarships and related assistance affects the labour supply 
of children and the marginal spending behaviour of households on children’s educational goods.  
Several key findings emerged from the study. We found strong effects on the reduction in the labour 
supply of children at the bottom of the welfare distribution due to Indonesia’s education cash transfers 
and related assistance. Households receiving educational transfers, scholarships and assistance were 
also found to spend more at the margin on voluntary educational goods. At the mean, households 
receiving educational transfers, scholarships and assistance spend 10% to 14% more on their children’s 
voluntary educational goods at the margin, than they would have spent without any additional 
educational support. 
These large marginal increases in education spending at the child-level arising from educational 
transfers and scholarships are thus confirmatory evidence for the existence of an intra-household 
flypaper effect. Educational transfers, scholarships and assistance have been associated with increased 
voluntary educational spending on the same child receiving the support with little re-allocation taking 
place within the household, providing strong evidence of benefits ‘sticking’ to children. If education 
transfers and assistance are viewed as transitory and uncertain streams of income and support, then 
our findings are consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which generally finds that the 
marginal propensity to invest out of transitory income (transfers, subsidies, remittances, etc.) is higher 
than that for permanent income such as salaries (Paxson,1992). 
It is evident that well-targeted and well-administered educational assistance programmes which lower 
the price of schooling can be successful in inducing children to spend less time on work, especially 
for the poor in Indonesia. Since the beneficial impacts of education transfers and support programmes 
are mostly concentrated among the poor and vulnerable, this highlights the benefits from identifying 
and selecting only poor and vulnerable households in any targeted education support intervention. 
Our results are particularly relevant for understanding the role of cash transfers and educational 
assistance in middle-income countries where enrolment rates are already at satisfactory levels, but the 
challenge is to keep the students in school at post-primary levels. Relatively higher marginal propensity 
to invest in educational goods among educational transfer and assistance- receiving households in 
Indonesia will no doubt be beneficial in augmenting human capital in the country at large. 
In sum, our findings suggest that educational transfers, scholarships and assistance are successful in 
increasing household investments in educational goods and simultaneously reducing children’s labour 
supply by providing an effective incentive to forgo the labour income. Our  results suggest that transfer 
schemes in Indonesia could be further improved and redesigned to increase and influence children’s 
educational spending  and time spent in school; for example, larger transfers, incentives for completion  
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and  payments  which  vary  with the spatial remoteness  of  the household could be considered. 
According to De Silva (2014), districts with low levels of school enrolment rates in Indonesia are 
characterised by high levels of poverty and low economic growth and output. Suryadarma (2006) 
found that children living in rural areas have less access to junior secondary education. Households 
living in remote, poor and backward regions in terms of economic performance (such as Papua, 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi) need special priority in the allocation of education scholarships. Allocation 
of government funds for the education transfer programme needs to disproportionately target lagging 
regions with severe poverty and low economic output. Thus, raising the quota of scholarships and 
provision of additional fiscal transfers to local government education budgets – with due consideration 
of spatial remoteness, regional disparities and economic backwardness – needs to be considered an 
important policy priority.  
A special emphasis could be placed on rural areas, with the condition that children in the households 
receiving the educational transfers must attend school and are not allowed to work at all. Improved 
targeting combined in particular with expansion of coverage and sharper geographical targeting of the 
programme, plus increasing the real value of the transfer, are possibly the most feasible policies for 
enhancing impacts on the educational achievements of children. 
The findings of this study lend support to the growing view in the literature that educational transfers, 
scholarships and related assistance can have a positive impact on economic development by increasing 
the level of investment in human capital. Finally, the principle message that emerges from the study is 
that there are quantitatively non-negligible, average gains from educational transfers and support 
programmes on household education spending and child labour, especially for the poor. 
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Appendix – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Receive education transfer 248101 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Total education expenditure (IDR) 248101 359548 346781 2000 20700000
Expenditure on books and stationary (IDR) 248101 67137 104054 1500 4500000
Expenditure-other support material (IDR) 248101 26900 62561 3000 3600000
Expenditure on tutoring (IDR) 248101 23089 104964 3500 5000000
Child-working 117561 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Child-inschool 117561 0.92 0.26 0.00 1.00
Informal-HHH 117561 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Poor sanitation 117561 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Dependency Ratio 117561 1.05 0.71 0.09 9.00
Poor household 117561 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Child-female 248101 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Child-age 248101 11.28 3.36 6.00 18.00
Urban 248101 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Age-Household Head (HHH) 248101 44.50 10.08 10.00 98.00
Female-HHH 248101 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Share male age 0-6 248101 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.57
Share female age 0-6 248101 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.60
Share males age 6-17 248101 0.21 0.16 0.00 1.00
Share females age 6-17 248101 0.20 0.16 0.00 1.00
Share females age 18-64 248101 0.25 0.10 0.00 1.00
Share males age 65+ 248101 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.67
Share females age 65+ 248101 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.67
HHH in Agri 248101 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
HHH in mining 248101 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
HHH in elec/gas/water 248101 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
HHH in construction 248101 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
HHH in trade/restaurent 248101 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
HHH edu-sd 248101 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
HHH edy-smp 248101 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
HHH edu-sma 248101 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
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Appendix – Descriptive Statistics (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
House-own 248101 0.83 0.38 0 1
House-lease/rent 248101 0.06 0.23 0 1
House-freelease 248101 0.02 0.15 0 1
House-official 248101 0.02 0.13 0 1
Floor-not soil 248101 0.90 0.30 0 1
Wall-concrete 248101 0.55 0.50 0 1
Wall-wood 248101 0.36 0.48 0 1
Roof-concrete/tile 248101 0.36 0.48 0 1
Roof-iron sheet 248101 0.49 0.50 0 1
Roof-asbestos 248101 0.04 0.20 0 1
Water-branded recycled 248101 0.09 0.28 0 1
Water piped meter 248101 0.16 0.37 0 1
Water-terrestial/pump 248101 0.12 0.33 0 1
Water-protected/well 248101 0.27 0.45 0 1
Water drinking-buy 248101 0.28 0.45 0 1
Electricity-PLN 248101 0.79 0.41 0 1
Electricity-non PLN 248101 0.08 0.26 0 1
Electricity-parafin/petro 248101 0.02 0.12 0 1
Toilet-tank/septic 248101 0.50 0.50 0 1
Toilet-river/lake/sea 248101 0.18 0.38 0 1
Toilet-pithole 248101 0.20 0.40 0 1
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Appendix: Binary Propensity Score Model, 𝐏𝐫(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝚽(𝑿′𝜷) 
 
Quintile -1 Quintile2 Quintile - 3 Quintile - 4 Quintile - 5
female 0.032 0.070*** 0.045* 0.121*** 0.094***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032)
age 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.038 0.062 0.018 -0.007 -0.143***
(0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Age-HHH -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Female-HHH 0.238*** 0.225*** 0.278*** 0.219*** 0.268***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050)
Share male age 0-6 0.183 -0.042 0.468*** -0.153 0.067
(0.160) (0.164) (0.170) (0.182) (0.197)
Share female age 0-6 0.032 0.063 0.021 -0.002 0.100
(0.162) (0.168) (0.176) (0.188) (0.202)
Share males age 6-17 -0.075 0.090 -0.118 0.102 -0.000
(0.137) (0.129) (0.128) (0.131) (0.125)
Share females age 6-17 0.060 0.129 0.021 -0.075 0.017
(0.138) (0.134) (0.131) (0.134) (0.136)
Share females age 18-64 0.032 0.120 0.040 0.043 -0.218
(0.172) (0.164) (0.158) (0.153) (0.148)
Share males age 65+ 0.222 0.406 0.453* 0.363 0.421
(0.279) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.292)
Share females age 65+ 0.102 -0.236 0.271 0.150 -0.296
(0.249) (0.242) (0.231) (0.239) (0.275)
HHH in Agri -0.003 0.035 0.010 0.018 0.132***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038)
HHH in mining -0.147 0.075 0.042 0.186** 0.126
(0.092) (0.090) (0.083) (0.082) (0.086)
HHH in elec/gas/water -0.064 -0.003 -0.046 -0.483* 0.076
(0.254) (0.250) (0.240) (0.287) (0.129)
HHH in construction -0.022 0.206*** 0.130*** 0.143*** -0.008
(0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.061)
HHH in trade/restaurent -0.025 -0.030 -0.075* -0.004 0.036
(0.052) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) (0.036)
HHH edu-sd 0.008 -0.042 -0.039 -0.044 0.062
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.038)
HHH edy-smp -0.033 -0.015 -0.012 -0.068* 0.000
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042)
HHH edu-sma -0.054 -0.086** -0.044 -0.088** -0.019
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Appendix: (Cont.): Binary Propensity Score Model, 𝐏𝐫(𝑫 = 𝟏|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝚽(𝑿′𝜷) 
 
Note: District dummies were included in all estimations but not reported. 
Quintile -1 Quintile2 Quintile - 3 Quintile - 4 Quintile - 5
House-own -0.037 -0.024 -0.118*** -0.198*** -0.096*
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.055)
House-lease/rent 0.027 0.207*** -0.015 -0.029 -0.032
(0.073) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.072)
House-freelease -0.102 -0.091 -0.224** -0.214** -0.070
(0.088) (0.091) (0.102) (0.096) (0.113)
House-official -0.230 -0.246 -0.241* -0.490*** -0.084
(0.191) (0.164) (0.129) (0.118) (0.084)
Floor-not soil -0.011 0.026 -0.133*** -0.059 0.005
(0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.056) (0.074)
Wall-concrete -0.134*** -0.221*** -0.094* -0.069 -0.148*
(0.044) (0.046) (0.051) (0.063) (0.077)
Wall-wood -0.008 -0.117** -0.011 0.001 -0.045
(0.042) (0.048) (0.052) (0.065) (0.081)
Roof-concrete/tile -0.038 -0.199*** -0.078 -0.152** -0.028
(0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.071) (0.079)
Roof-iron sheet -0.061 -0.218*** -0.058 -0.103* 0.013
(0.040) (0.044) (0.051) (0.053) (0.067)
Roof-asbestos -0.141* -0.205** -0.073 -0.131* -0.055
(0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.080) (0.092)
Water-branded recycled 0.060 -0.015 0.023 -0.120* -0.087
(0.090) (0.080) (0.073) (0.068) (0.061)
Water piped meter -0.042 0.040 0.126** -0.033 -0.005
(0.058) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
Water-terrestial/pump 0.084* -0.081* -0.024 -0.044 -0.004
(0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.053)
Water-protected/well -0.006 -0.041 -0.017 -0.109*** 0.022
(0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.045)
Water drinking-buy -0.003 -0.101** -0.090** -0.096** 0.043
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.042)
Electricity-PLN -0.023 0.053 -0.068 -0.085 0.082
(0.039) (0.045) (0.048) (0.057) (0.086)
Electricity-non PLN 0.016 0.084 -0.006 -0.053 0.034
(0.054) (0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.095)
Electricity-parafin/petro -0.152* -0.184 -0.024 0.039 -0.181
(0.088) (0.114) (0.106) (0.127) (0.213)
Toilet-tank/septic -0.113*** -0.070* -0.097** -0.023 -0.124*
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.066)
Toilet-river/lake/sea -0.102** 0.012 0.008 0.024 0.042
(0.041) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056) (0.076)
Toilet-pithole -0.105*** 0.008 -0.047 0.020 -0.015
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.054) (0.072)
Constant -2.249*** -1.994*** -1.610*** -1.395*** -5.575***
(0.440) (0.299) (0.324) (0.310) (0.197)
Observations 44,137 45,222 44,953 45,445 44,067
Pseudo R-Squared 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18
